On Seller Estimates and Buyer Returns by Gershkov, Alex & Toxvaerd, Flavio
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 

























*Alex Gershkov, University of Bonn, Department of Economics, Economic Theory II, Lennéstrasse 37, 53113 Bonn, 
Germany. Tel: +49 228737993, Fax: +49 228737940, alex.gershkov@uni-bonn.de 
**Flavio Toxvaerd, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, 
Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0) 1223 335258, Fax: +44 (0) 1223 335475, fmot2@cam.ac.uk   ,   




Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
 
Discussion Paper No. 143 
On Seller Estimates  
and Buyer Returns 
Alex Gershkov* 
Flavio Toxvaerd** 
ON SELLER ESTIMATES AND BUYER RETURNS∗
Alex Gershkov†and Flavio Toxvaerd‡
February 2, 2006
Abstract. This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in
arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in
auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been
held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of
asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing
evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction
theory.
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1. Introduction
Asymmetry of information is pervasive in markets for financial assets. Sellers of assets such as
shares of newly floated companies as well as objects of fine art may have better information
about true values than potential buyers, and have an inherent interest in distorting sales
prices upwards. This fact raises the concern that buyers may be lead to overpay for assets and
let themselves be fooled by information supplied by the seller. The empirical evidence seems
inconclusive. Bradshaw et al. (2003) confidently assert that “[the] evidence [...] suggests that
investors are systematically fooled by analyst hype”. If such conclusions are taken at face
value, we are facing a potentially huge problem of market inefficiency which casts shadow
over the investment advice provided by sellers of assets. It is therefore of great importance to
study the robustness and interpretations of studies suggestive of such sell-side manipulation
and buyer gullibility.
In recent empirical research, Moses and Mei (2005) describe and study a natural experi-
ment that occurred in the market for fine art. Prior to 1973, buyers of art at auction houses
such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s largely relied on own information and research when valu-
ing pieces put up for sale. After 1973, both auction houses publicly announced valuations of
all items offered for sale. This situation provides an ideal context within which to test the
effects that announced seller valuations have on prices of assets. Their main findings can
be summarized as follows: (i) Auctioneer price estimates are biased, (ii) Bidders tend to pay
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2more for objects with high auctioneer price estimates and (iii) The introduction of auctioneer
price estimates caused long-term under performance of auctioned objects. The authors take
these findings to suggest that buyers of art are credulous and that auction houses exploit
this fact to further their own interests.
In this paper, we revisit these findings by providing a simple formal model of the afore-
mentioned natural experiment, in which all bidders are fully rational. Within this model,
we show that it is consistent with equilibrium behavior for bidders to bid more aggressively
for items with higher announced valuations and that the shift from a regime without public
valuations to one with such valuations can lead to a decrease in long-term returns for bidders.
Moses and Mei’s (2005) finding that auctioneer estimates are biased (significantly so,
although quite small) should be contrasted to previous studies such as Keane and Runkle
(1998) who fail to find the existence of bias. In itself, estimation bias is not of interest
in the current context unless bidders are found to react to announced price estimates. In
other words, if bidders were oblivious to announced price estimates, such estimates would be
inconsequential. This motivates Moses and Mei’s (2005) analysis of bidder reactions to public
price estimates. They find that bidders tend to pay more for items with higher announced
auctioneer price estimates.
What should or can one conclude based on such an observation? Clearly, were it indeed
the case that auction houses were manipulating information and exploiting gullible bidders
by providing them with biased price estimates, such a finding would be expected. Unfor-
tunately, concluding that bidders are gullible would be premature, since such a pattern in
price reactions is equally consistent with a more benign state of affairs, namely that auction
houses truthfully reveal the information they possess and that bidders in turn rationally bid
more aggressively for higher value items. This difficulty leads to the natural experiment
provided by the introduction of public price estimates in 1973.
The approach adopted by Moses and Mei (2005) is to consider what effects the regime
change had on bidder returns. If the introduction of price estimates changed bidder returns
to the worse, they argue, this would constitute prima facie evidence that bidders are being
misled by the manipulated information provided by auction houses. Specifically, their analy-
sis is as follows. They consider a large data set of prices of items for which three consecutive
sales have been recorded. This allows us to determine the effects (if any) that the introduc-
tion of price estimates had on returns to a particular item over different holding periods (i.e.
the adjusted change in price from the date at which the item was acquired until the date at
which it was resold). Figure 1 shows their setup schematically. For some part of the data
set (scenario A), the first sale occurred prior to 1973 while the second two sales occurred
after 1973. The remaining part of the data set (scenario B), consists of items which had two
recorded sales prior to 1973 and one recorded sale after.
The strategy of their analysis is as follows. If, as the authors conjecture, the introduction
of price estimates creates an upward pressure on prices, only items sold in the second regime
(i.e. post price estimate introduction) would be thus influenced. In turn, this would mean
that the return in holding period 1 (from t = 1 to t = 2) in scenario A would be larger than
the return in holding period 1 in scenario B. Similarly, the return in holding period 2 (from
t = 2 to t = 3) in scenario A should be lower than the return in holding period 2 in scenario
B.
3Below, we shall argue that both findings (ii) and (iii) are consistent with fully ratio-
nal behavior, and furthermore that both observations are essentially reflections of the same
mechanisms at work. Specifically, our setup is as follows. We consider two different regimes,
consistent with the situations prevailing before and after the introduction of auctioneer val-
uations. In the first regime, bidders receive private signals before participating in a standard
English auction. No further information is disclosed before bidding takes place. In the sec-
ond regime, everything is as in the first regime, with the difference that before bidding takes
place, the auctioneer publicly announces all bidders’ signals. We then go on to study two
different scenarios, like scenarios A and B in Moses and Mei’s (2005) study. We show that in
equilibrium, the return in holding period 1 in scenario A is larger than the return in holding
period 1 in scenario B. Similarly, we show that the return in holding period 2 in scenario A
is lower than the return in holding period 2 in scenario B.
In short, we show that the decrease in long-term return on assets during holding periods
that straddle the introduction of publicly announced auctioneer valuations are due to the
fact that more information is released, which in turn prompts bidders to rationally bid more
aggressively than they otherwise would have.
2. Model and Analysis
A single object is offered for sale to a set N = {1, ..., n} of potential risk neutral buyers. The
object will be resold several times using an English auction. Prior to the auction at time
t = 1, 2, 3, each bidder i privately observes the realization of a signal sti ∈ Sti = [0, 1]. This
signal is informative about the object’s future resale value and possibly some intrinsic value.
We assume that the value of the object to bidder i is Ui(st), where st = (st1, ..., s
t
n) is the
vector of observed signals of all bidders in period t. Denote by st−i the vector of observed
signals of all bidders but i. Let Ui(st) ≡ U(sti, st−i), that is the value function is invariant to











In short, condition (1) means that a bidder’s own signal affects his valuation at least as much
as the signals of rival bidders. If the first inequality holds as a strict equality, we are in the
pure common values case. The last inequality excludes the pure private values setting in
which the auctioneer’s estimate of the object’s value is irrelevant for the bidders.
Note that the function Ui(st) can be thought of as a reduced form for some suitably dis-
counted expected future stream of earnings. The chosen setup allows for both common value
and private value components. The possibility of future resale of bought assets generates a
common value element, while different tastes in art or different portfolio requirements can
account for a private value component.
We consider the following two regimes. In the first regime, no additional information is
revealed, while in second regime, the auctioneer announces some message that completely
reveals all the information to all bidders.
Figure 1 shows our setup schematically. Before 1973, we are in the first regime while
after 1973, we are in the second regime. What we want to determine is what impact the
disclosure of information by the auctioneer has on the return on an asset, defined as the
4Figure 1: The Two Scenarios under the Two Regimes.
difference between the price of an object when acquired by a bidder and the obtained price
when the object is later resold. In particular, we will compare the return in holding period
1 (from t = 1 to t = 2) and in holding period 2 (from t = 2 to t = 3) in scenario A versus
scenario B, consistent with the setup considered by Moses and Mei (2005).
In order to make this comparison, we will first determine the equilibrium of auctions
conducted under the two different regimes.
We analyze the situation as a sequence of one shot games and not as a repeated game,
since even though we assume that the number of the participants does not change, the set of
players may differ from one period to the next. However, this does not preclude the signals
from being correlated across periods. What we do exclude is that a given period’s signals
can be perfectly inferred from knowledge of previous periods’ signals.
2.1. First Regime (Auction without Auctioneer Estimate). The following reason-
ing follows that of Milgrom and Weber (1982). In an English auction, initially all bidders
are active at the price 0. As the auctioneer increases the price, bidders drop out one by
one. No bidder who has dropped out can become active again. After any bidder quits, all
remaining active bidders know the price at which he quit. Therefore, a strategy of a bidder
specifies whether, at a given price level p, he will remain active or drop out, as a function
of his signal, the number of bidders who have quit the bidding, and the levels at which they
quit.
Let k denote the number of bidders who have quit and let p1 ≤ ... ≤ pk denote the levels
at which they did so. Then bidder i’s strategy can be described by functions bk(sti, p1, ..., pk)
which specify the price at which bidder i will quit if, at that point, k other bidders have quit
at the prices p1, ..., pk.
Denote by sˆtj the jth highest signal among all bidders but i. Then, the following strategies
constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium1:
1 It can be shown that the following strategies constitute an ex-post equilibrium. For a formal proof, see
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s : bj−1(sˆtn−j , p1, ..., pj−1) = pj if j quit at pj
sti otherwise
(3)
In words, this strategy means that if nobody dropped out yet, every bidder remains active
until the price reaches his expected utility, conditional on the event that all bidders observe
exactly the same signal as his own. If some bidders dropped out, the remaining bidders learn
the signals of these bidders. In this case, the equilibrium strategy of the active bidders is to
update their valuations, only for the signals of the bidders that decided to quit.
The considered strategies deserve further comment. In principle, the bidders could em-
ploy strategies at some auction that condition on previously revealed information. Consider
the auction at t = 2. In this auction, all bidders know the price levels at which players quit
at the auction at t = 1, which in turn reveals their respective valuations at that point in
time. But, if signals are correlated over time, this information is informative also about the
players’ current valuations.
Should they take this information into account when deciding when to quit in the current
auction? We argue that it is indeed consistent with equilibrium behavior not to do so. The
arguments is as follows. Assume that all bidders but i use the strategies described above.
Bidder i, even after observing the true realization of the other bidders’ signals, would not
want to change his strategy because we are in an ex-post equilibrium. Therefore, he would
not want to change his strategy based on incomplete information about the other bidders’
signals, as provided by knowledge of the signal realizations in previous rounds.2
2.2. Second Regime (Auction with Auctioneer Estimate). Now assume that be-
fore conducting the auction, the auctioneer reports a message that reveals all signals to all
bidders. In this case we have a game of complete information, and there is a dominant strat-
egy equilibrium in which every bidder quits once the price reaches his value of the object,
regardless of the prices at which other bidders quit. That is, we have
b(s) = U(sti, s
t
−i) (4)
Note that because in this regime we have complete information, these bidding strategies
constitute ex-post equilibrium strategies.
2.3. Comparison of the Two Regimes. Let bt(i) be the ith highest bid in period t,
and let σ be the auctioneer’s message. With this notation, we can now state the following
result:
Theorem 1. Revenues in the second regime are higher than or equal to the revenues in the
first regime. Formally,
b2(2)(s
2, σ) ≥ b2(2)(s2) (5)
2 It should be noted though that there may be equilibria in which all bidders do take such knowledge into
account.
6Proof. Note that in the first regime, the payment of the winner equals the utility of
the second highest bidder, conditional on all signals less than his own and on the event that
the highest signal equals his own. In the second regime, the expected payment equals the
utility of the second highest bidder, conditional on all signals less then his own and on the
true highest signal which is strictly higher than his own signal (with probability 1)
Note that the theorem also implies that expected revenues in the second regime are
strictly higher than in the first regime.
2.4. Returns on Assets Across Scenarios. Now consider the returns on an asset,
depending on whether or not the holding period straddles the point in time where the
auctioneer announces his information to the bidders. Note that we have implicitly assumed
that the bidders in the first (pre-announcement) regime do not anticipate the auctioneer’s
future information disclosure. Denote by ∆hr the return in holding period r = 1, 2 in scenario
h = A,B. The relevant returns are then given by
∆A1 (s
1, s2, σ) = b2(2)(s
2, σ)− b1(2)(s1) (6)
∆A2 (s
1, s2, σ) = b3(2)(s
3, σ)− b2(2)(s2, σ) (7)
∆B1 (s
1, s2) = b2(2)(s
2)− b1(2)(s1) (8)
∆B2 (s
1, s2, σ) = b3(2)(s
3, σ)− b2(2)(s2) (9)
From these definitions and (5), the following results follow:
Theorem 2.
∆A1 (s
1, s2, σ)−∆B1 (s1, s2) = b2(2)(s2, σ)− b2(2)(s2) ≥ 0 (10)
∆A2 (s
1, s2, σ)−∆B2 (s1, s2, σ) = b2(2)(s2)− b2(2)(s2, σ) ≤ 0 (11)
In words, (10) means that the return in holding period 1 in scenario A is higher than the
equivalent return in scenario B. Similarly, (11) means that the return in holding period 2 in
scenario A is lower than the equivalent return in scenario B.
These results should be contrasted with the empirical findings from arts auctions sum-
marized above. Indeed, the model we have analyzed can predict exactly the price movements
that Moses and Mei (2005) found in the data.
3. Robustness and Extensions
These results, while derived in a very simple setting, are quite robust. First, as already
mentioned, we allow for almost any type of dependence of signals across periods. Actually,
the equilibria we have derived are distribution free, meaning that none of the strategies or
resulting equilibria depend on distributional assumptions.
One may wonder if the results would be changed if the auctioneer, instead of revealing
all available information, could somehow garble his signal when informing the bidders. If the
auctioneer can commit ex-ante to a disclosure policy, then he would always find it optimal
to fully disclose whichever information he has. This is an instance of the linkage principle
(see Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
7What would happen if the auctioneer, instead of having perfect information, only has
noisy or imperfect information at his disposal? In that case, our results would continue to
hold under the additional assumption that the auctioneer’s signal, as well as all the bidders’
signals, are affiliated. Affiliation can be thought of roughly as strong positive correlation.
We should comment on our choice of equilibria. In both regimes, we have picked specific
equilibria and then compared these. For completeness, it should be mentioned there exist
other equilibria which may yield different results. In the first regime, we have focused only
on symmetric equilibria. There may exist other, asymmetric equilibria in which the bidders
employ complicated strategies. We disregard these for simplicity.
Next, it should be pointed out that the equilibrium strategies considered under the first
regime would also constitute equilibrium strategies under the second regime. In this case,
the equilibrium would be in dominated strategies but constitute a Nash equilibrium nev-
ertheless.3 We focus on the dominant strategy equilibrium since these are a natural first
approach in a complete information game.
As described in the introduction, the fact that equilibrium prices are increasing in the
auctioneer’s announced valuation can be understood in terms of the aforementioned linkage
principle.4 Although not derived in the context of the above model, the reasoning can be
understood as follows. In a nutshell, the linkage principle states that if an auctioneer is
able to credibly commit to any information revelation policy, he can do no better than to
truthfully reveal all available information to the bidders prior to the auction. This principle
holds for several auction formats such as English, second price, first price and others. In
consequence, if the auctioneer’s estimate increases, the bidders believe the auctioned object
to be of greater value and thus rationally increase their bids. In this way, the linkage principle
yields exactly the relationship between estimates and equilibrium prices identified in the data
by Moses and Mei (2005).5
Last, the English auction format has been assumed in the above analysis for expositional
simplicity and because the data analyzed by Moses and Mei (2005) was generated by English
auctions. The results would continue to hold for the second price auction as well as for
the first price auction under the additional assumption that signals are independent across
periods.
4. Discussion
In this paper we revisit recent empirical research on auctioneer estimates and their reported
adverse effects on bidder returns. We argue that elementary results in auction theory yield
predictions consistent with such empirical findings, thus casting doubt on the validity of the
claim that buyers are fooled by the information provided by interested sellers. In contrast, we
believe that the empirical findings can serve as an indirect test of some of the basic tenets of
auction theory, among them the notion that bidders are fully rational and cannot be misled
in equilibrium.
3 In this equilibrium though, the bidders ignore the auctioneer’s message and use the same strategies as in
the first regime.
4See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a formal statement and proof of this principle.
5This principle is quite robust, holding for all the formats previously mentioned as long as the auctioneer’s
signal is affiliated with the bidders’ signals.
8The interesting question of buyer credulity remains though. The difficulty in showing
buyer gullibility is that the signs of the price changes that could potentially show that bidders
are misled are, as we have shown, the same as those predicted by a model of fully rational
agents. This means that it is insufficient to look at the signs of price changes and that the
magnitude of these should be more closely studied.
In conclusion, evidence of bidder credulity should be provided by showing that the price
reactions to publicly announced auctioneer price estimates are significantly over and above
the levels predicted by the assumption of rational behavior. Empirically implementing such
a study would be interesting and is left for future research.
Our analysis also carries lessons for markets for other assets than fine art, as nothing in
our model is particular to the art market.
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